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ABSTRACT:  Many  researchers  have 
shown that capital markets in CEE 
countries are weakly efficient in terms of 
calendar anomalies. The goal of this paper 
is to investigate whether the capital market 
in Montenegro is efficient regarding some of 
these anomalies. The main characteristics 
of the Montenegrin capital market are 
briefly explained. The empirical analysis 
is done on the daily values data of stock 
market index NEX20. An investigation 
of the January effect is implemented with 
the graphical representation of the rate of 
return for all the months of the seven-year 
period and by estimation of a regression 
model of return on index NEX20. The 
intercept represents the value of the 
return in January and it is insignificant. 
The holiday effect, tested by graphical 
representation for the Statehood Day data, 
was not present in the whole period. To 
investigate the turn-of-the-month effect we 
employed the graphical representation and 
regression model of the return rate on index 
NEX20 for the last week of every month 
and for the rest of the month. The value of 
the intercept, representing return for the 
last week of the month, is significant. The 
absence of some tested calendar anomalies 
suggests that the Montenegrin capital 
market is becoming more efficient.
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1. ThE CApITAl MARKET In MOnTEnEgRO
The development of the capital market in Montenegro started in 2001. This was 
the time when the mass voucher privatization of state-own companies was still 
in the process of being completed. The main precondition for capital market 
development in Montenegro was the foundation of a stock exchange. 
The Montenegro Stock Exchange was established in June 1993, on the basis of 
the Law on Money and the Capital Market. In July 1995 the Montenegro Stock 
Exchange harmonized its business activities in compliance with the Law on 
Stock Exchange, Stock Exchange Activities and Agents. The Montenegro Stock 
Exchange obtained a founding license from the Federal Ministry of Finance, a 
license for trading with short term securities from the Yugoslav Central Bank, 
and a license for trading with long term securities from the Federal Securities 
Commission.
Since September 2006 the Montenegro Stock Exchange has been an entirely 
privately owned company, due to the fact that the Government of Montenegro 
sold its 5% stake in the Montenegro Stock Exchange by auction sale on the stock 
market. For this package the price was €1,100 per share, or five times more than 
the nominal value, representing a market capitalization of the Stock Exchange of 
€1.4 million.
Even though the first stock exchange in Montenegro was founded in 1993, the 
first trade with long term securities was realized only after Parliament passed 
the Law on Securities in 2002. The Law on Securities regulates the terms and 
conditions for issuance, public offering, and trading of securities, the rights and 
obligations of participants in the securities market, and the organization, scope, 
and powers of the Securities Commission. 
The New Montenegrin Stock Exchange (NEX Montenegro) Podgorica was 
founded in September 2001. It was given work authorization in November 2001 
by the Montenegrin Securities Commission. 
The NEX Montenegro Stock Exchange calculated two indexes, NEX20 and 
NEXPIF. The index of the NEX Montenegro Stock Exchange, NEX20, consisted 
of 20 issuers’ share, determined on the basis of market capitalization, turnover, 
and number of concluded transactions. The start value of the stock index was 
1,000 stock market points. The basic goal of calculating and publishing the index MONTENEGRIN CAPITAL MARKET: CALENDAR ANOMALIES
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of the Securities Exchange NEX Montenegro was to provide the public with 
information on movements in certain segments of the market. 
Until the end of 2010 Montenegro has had two stock exchanges, Montenegro 
Stock Exchange and NEX Montenegro Stock Exchange. In January 2010 
stockholders in NEX approved a merger with the Montenegro Stock Exchange, 
initially expected to take place within two to three months. However, the two 
were technically merged on December 31, 2010, and their systems have been 
jointly operating since January 10, 2011. The merger consolidated and simplified 
securities trading in Montenegro.
After the merger with NEX Montenegro was established the principal stock 
exchange indexes became MONEX20 and MONEXPIF. The starting value of the 
MONEX20 index on January 1, 2011 was 14,522.53 stock market points, and the 
same value for the MONEXPIF index was 6,595.82 stock market points.
The Securities Commission Montenegro (SCM) is the market regulator. The SCM 
was founded in 2000 and it took over the jurisdiction from the Yugoslav Federal 
Commission for Securities and Financial Markets. The SCM has the authority to 
enact implementing provisions to the Law on Securities, to approve and supervise 
public offers of securities, to license and supervise security market participants, 
to authorize and regulate collective investment schemes, to regulate the manner 
and scope of the trading in the securities market, and to regulate takeovers. 
According to the Securities Law, trading of securities can be performed only at 
the official stock exchanges; therefore no Over The Counter (OTC) market exists 
in Montenegro.
The bond market in Montenegro is limited to issuing T-bonds and T-bills by the 
Central Bank of Montenegro and therefore it is undeveloped. It can be concluded 
that the capital market in Montenegro is actually the stock market. 
2. CAlEnDAR AnOMAlIES
For almost ten years after the publication of Fama’s classic exposition in 1970, 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) dominated the academic and business 
scene. According to this hypothesis the market is efficient if its prices are formed 
on the basis of all disposable information. One stock market is efficient only if all 110
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relevant information about the company are incorporated in its the stock price. 
But soon critics of EMH produced a wide range of arguments. 
The assumption that investors are rational and therefore value investments 
rationally – that is, by calculating the net present values of future cash flows, 
appropriately discounted for risk – has not been supported by empirical evidence. 
Rather the evidence shows that investors are affected by herd instinct, a tendency 
to “churn” their portfolios, and a tendency to under-react or over-react to news or 
asymmetrical judgements about the causes of previous profits and losses. 
Furthermore, many alleged anomalies have been detected in the patterns of 
historical share prices. The best known are calendar anomalies. 
There is evidence that abnormal equity returns are associated with the turn of 
the year, the week, and the month, as well as with holidays and the time of day. 
These returns are not unique to one historical period, nor can they be explained 
by considerations of risk or value. Tax-loss selling at year-end, cash flows at 
month-end, and negative news releases over the weekend may explain some 
of these return abnormalities. But human psychology offers a more promising 
explanation. Calendar anomalies tend to occur at turning points in time. While 
these artificial moments have little economic significance, investors may deem 
them important, and behave accordingly. The question remains why these 
effects, which have been recognized for some years, have not been arbitraged 
away. Trading costs are, of course, an impediment. A portfolio manager would 
not consider liquidating an entire portfolio on a Friday merely in order to avoid 
experiencing relatively poor weekend returns. However, planned trades can be 
scheduled to take advantage of calendar-based return patterns. Calendar effects 
should be of particular importance to traders.
The January effect, the holiday effect and the the Turn-of-the-month effect for 
the Montenegrin capital market will be tested and presented in the following 
sections of the paper.
2.1 The January effect
The month of January in the stock market has strong significance in predicting 
the trend of the stock market for the rest of the calendar year. This phenomena 
occurs between the last trading day in December of the previous year and the 
fifth trading day of the new year in January. The January effect is a result of 
tax-loss selling which causes investors to sell their losing positions at the end of MONTENEGRIN CAPITAL MARKET: CALENDAR ANOMALIES
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December. Therefore, the main characteristic of the January effect is an increase 
in buying securities before the end of the year at a lower price, in order to sell 
them in January to generate profit from the price differences.
For example, after discovering the January effect, investors who expect the stock 
price to appreciate in January will then purchase before January and sell at the end 
of January. This will drive up the stock prices before January and push down the 
prices at the end of January, resulting in the diminishing or even disappearance 
of the January effect. 
The January effect has been observed in many countries. Gultekin and Gultekin 
(1983) investigated the January effect in seventeen major industrialized 
countries and found unusually high January returns in most of the countries 
studied (specifically, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland).
The growth rate of Montengrin stock exchange index NEX20 for all the months 
of the year during the seven year period 2004-2010 was analyzed and the results 
are presented in the following graph.
Graph 1:  NEX20 index growth rate in the months of the year, 2004 – 2010
Source:  authors’ calculation112
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According to these results, the growth rate of the NEX20 index does not have 
the highest value during January. The highest growth rate of the stock exchange 
index was realized in May with 0.55% of change, while in January the value of 
growth rate was only 0.19%. Therefore the January effect is not present in the 
Montenegrin capital market.
The next step is to test the statistical significance of the previous conclusion about 
the January effect on the Montenegrin capital market. To construct the test for 
specific calendar anomalies, it is necessary to create the series according to the 
following formula:
 (1)
where Pt denotes the closing price of the index on day t. The expected return and 
the variance of Rt are denoted by μt ≡ E(Rt) and ≡Var(Rt), and it is also assumed 
that the sequence of returns are uncorrelated between dates t and s, for all t ≠ s 
or Cov(Rt, Rs) = 0.
Donald B. Keim (1983) suggested a regression model with dummy variables as a 
method of testing the January effect. It takes the following form:
 (2)
where Dt represents monthly dummy variables defined as follows: D2 is 1 for 
February and 0 for other months, D3 is 1 for March and 0 for other months, and 
so on, and e is the error term. The intercept constant a represents the average 
January return since January is represented by the situation when each of 11 
dummy variables is equal to 0. The expected return for February is equal to a+b2. 
If the dummy variable coefficients all are negative, it indicates that the January 
return is the largest; i.e., it is consistent with the January effect. If the dummy 
variable coefficient is positive, it indicates that the given month’s return is greater 
than the January return. Test results of the January effect for the NEX20 stock 
exchange index are as follows:MONTENEGRIN CAPITAL MARKET: CALENDAR ANOMALIES
113
Dependent Variable: RTNEX20
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 3/04/2003 12/31/2010
Included observations: 2044 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.000766 0.000637 1.202123 0.2295
D2 -7.39E-05 0.000922 -0.080223 0.9361
D3 0.000230 0.000871 0.264091 0.7917
D4 0.000374 0.000877 0.426872 0.6695
D5 0.000448 0.000874 0.512474 0.6084
D6 -0.001337 0.000876 -1.525798 0.1272
D7 6.23E-05 0.000871 0.071453 0.9430
D8 0.000836 0.000873 0.958136 0.3381
D9 -0.000275 0.000876 -0.313836 0.7537
D10 -0.000668 0.000873 -0.765272 0.4442
D11 -0.002380 0.000878 -2.708874 0.0068
D12 0.000382 0.000869 0.439652 0.6602
F-statistic 2.193090 Prob(F-statistic) 0.012587
For the Montenegrin capital market, almost all estimated dummy variable 
coefficients are positive and almost none of them are statistically significant. The 
intercept is positive too, but it is not the coefficient with the highest value and it 
is not statistically significant. The results, therefore, are not consistent with the 
January effect. 
Since statistical significance for the intercept was not achieved in the last model 
estimation, the next step should be an estimation of the same model but for two 
or more sub-samples. Taking into account that the world financial crisis occurred 
in 2008, we decided to create two sub-samples: one containing the data for the 
2003-2007 period before the crisis, and one with data from the 2008-2010 period 
during the crisis. 
The estimated model for the period from 2003 to the end of 2007 is given in the 
next table.114
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Dependent Variable: RT
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 3/04/2003 12/31/2007
Included observations: 1260 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.001541 0.000790 1.949843 0.0514
D2 0.000249 0.001145 0.217506 0.8278
D3 0.001072 0.001058 1.013388 0.3111
D4 0.000301 0.001069 0.281401 0.7784
D5 -0.000613 0.001058 -0.579658 0.5623
D6 -0.001469 0.001065 -1.380037 0.1678
D7 -0.000790 0.001063 -0.743504 0.4573
D8 0.000802 0.001056 0.759759 0.4475
D9 -0.000514 0.001067 -0.481903 0.6300
D10 0.000563 0.001060 0.530635 0.5958
D11 -0.002755 0.001065 -2.587746 0.0098
D12 -0.000593 0.001060 -0.559002 0.5763
F-statistic 2.227302 Prob(F-statistic) 0.010335
It is clear that the January effect was present in the capital market in Montenegro 
in the pre-crisis period. The intercept coefficient is positive and has the highest 
value compared to the dummy variable coefficients. It is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. The whole model is statistically significant at the 10% level.
The estimated model for the post-crisis period is almost the same as the model 
for the whole period. The January effect is not present, the intercept coefficient as 
well as the whole model is not statistically significant.
2.2 The holiday effect
The holiday effect refers to the tendency of the market to do well on any day which 
precedes a holiday. It means that participants in the capital market are much 
more optimistic before holidays and that the growth rate of stock prices is higher 
in that period compared to those after holidays.
To investigate the holiday effect on the capital market in Montenegro we have 
chosen July 13th, Statehood Day. The results are given in the graph below.MONTENEGRIN CAPITAL MARKET: CALENDAR ANOMALIES
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Graph 2:  Holiday effect on the Montenegrin capital market
The stock exchange index NEX20 growth rate values one week prior and two 
weeks after the July 13th holiday were analysed for the 2004-2010 period. The 
results show that the growth rate one week before the July 13th holiday has a 
value of 0.45%, but it is not the highest growth rate within the analyzed period. 
The holiday effect has no significant impact on the capital market in Montenegro. 
The highest growth rate of index NEX20 was realized in July 2006.
2.3 Turn-of-the-month effect
The turn-of-the-month effect is the tendency of stock prices to increase during 
the last two days and the first three days of each month. Some researchers ascribe 
the effect to the timing of monthly cash flows received by pension funds and 
reinvested in the stock market. Using the data of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA) index for the period 1897-1986, Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) 
found that the mean return on turn-of-the-month trading days is about eight 
times higher than on other trading days.
To analyze the turn-of-the-month effect two years are chosen, 2004 and 2008. 
2004 is the year with the highest value of trade turnover, because the citizens in 
Montenegro actively started to participate in the capital market. 2008 is the year 
when the world financial crisis began, which is the reason for choosing this year. 
The results are illustrated in Graph 3.116
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Graph 3:  Turn-of-the-month effect on the Montenegrin capital market in 2004.
The red bar in the graph represents the monthly growth rate of the NEX20 index 
for the last week of the month. The yellow bar is the growth rate for the whole 
month. The results show that the turn-of-the-month effect is partly present. This 
effect is significant in all the months of 2004 except June, July, and December.
Graph 4:  Turn-of-the-month effect in the Montenegrin capital market in 2008.MONTENEGRIN CAPITAL MARKET: CALENDAR ANOMALIES
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The effect of the world financial crisis is present in 2008. Growth rates are 
negative for almost all months. Turn-of-the-month effect is recognized in this 
year because the growth rates are significantly higher at the end of the month 
compared to those for the whole month. 
Next step is to test whether the turn-of-the month effect in the Montenegrin 
capital market is statistically significant. The test is based on the following 
regression model
 (3)
where Rt is the continuous compounded return on the stock index, Dt is daily 
dummy variables defined as follows: D1 is 1 for the first day of the month and 
0 for other days of the month, D2 is 1 for the second day of the month and 0 
for other days, etc., and e is the error term. The intercept constant a represents 
the average return for the end of every month of the year, since those days are 
represented by the situation when each of the 24 dummy variables is equal to 0. 
The expected return for the first day of the month is equal to (a+b1). If the dummy 
variable coefficients are all negative it indicates that the return at the end of the 
month is the largest, and it is consistent with the turn-of-the-month effect. If the 
coefficient of a dummy variable is positive it indicates that the given days’ return 
is greater than the return for the days at the end of one month.
The results of the estimation are as follows:
Dependent Variable: RTNEX20
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 3/04/2003 12/31/2010
Included observations: 2044 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.001207 0.000382 3.159776 0.0016
D1 7.52E-05 0.001035 0.072705 0.9420
D2 -0.000948 0.001028 -0.922295 0.3565
D3 -0.002769 0.001048 -2.641460 0.0083
D4 -0.000583 0.001048 -0.555926 0.5783
D5 -9.02E-05 0.001041 -0.086584 0.9310
D6 -0.000497 0.001048 -0.474070 0.6355
D7 -0.000598 0.001041 -0.574032 0.5660118
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D8 -0.000139 0.001035 -0.134648 0.8929
D9 -0.001983 0.001028 -1.928519 0.0539
D10 -0.002603 0.001041 -2.500027 0.0125
D11 -0.000145 0.001048 -0.138580 0.8898
D12 -0.000342 0.001041 -0.328860 0.7423
D13 -3.90E-05 0.001048 -0.037251 0.9703
D14 -0.001517 0.001041 -1.456384 0.1454
D15 -0.002015 0.001035 -1.947741 0.0516
D16 -0.001408 0.001028 -1.369674 0.1709
D17 -0.001715 0.001041 -1.647193 0.0997
D18 0.000181 0.001048 0.172711 0.8629
D19 -0.000366 0.001041 -0.351713 0.7251
D20 -0.001257 0.001048 -1.199672 0.2304
D21 0.000816 0.001041 0.783689 0.4333
D22 -0.000182 0.001035 -0.175481 0.8607
D23 0.000226 0.001028 0.220189 0.8257
D24 -0.001496 0.001041 -1.436477 0.1510
F-statistic 1.069996 Prob(F-statistic) 0.370811
The estimated intercept has greater value than the dummy variable coefficients. 
It is also statistically significant at the 1% level. It means that turn-of-the-month 
effect is present in the capital market of Montenegro. In this test the data for 
the whole analyzed period have been used. Nevertheless, from the test results 
it is clear that not all the coefficients of the dummy variables are statistically 
significant. It is also important to know that this regression is not statistically 
significant.
3. COnCluSIOnS
The goal of this paper was to examine the presence of calendar anomalies in 
the Montenegrin stock market. We investigated whether the Montenegrin capital 
market suffers from the January effect, the holiday effect. and the turn-of-the-
month effect.
Empirical evidence indicates that the January effect was present in the 
Montenegrin capital market before the financial crisis, but not in the crisis 
period. However, the absence of January effect in the crisis period may be the MONTENEGRIN CAPITAL MARKET: CALENDAR ANOMALIES
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result of the small sample used for the analysis, due to lack of available data. It 
has been shown that the holiday effect has no great impact on this capital market. 
At the same time the research proves the presence of the last tested anomaly, the 
turn-of-the-month effect.
Most of the research supports the argument that anomalies will diminish and 
eventually disappear after their discovery, as more and more investors exploit the 
anomalies effect. 
Even though it could be expected that a small capital market, such as the 
Montenegrin market, would be inefficient, the results of our investigation show 
the opposite. The disappearance of at least one of three tested calendar anomalies 
from the Montenegrin capital market suggests that this market is becoming 
more efficient. This is mainly due to more knowledgeable and experienced 
investors, advances in information technology and communications, lower cost 
of information, etc.
Hence, in the present discussion on capital market calendar anomalies our results 
stand as evidence in favour of those who advocate market efficiency. 
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